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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the improper and defective installation of manure handling 
equipment by Defendants Standley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. (hereinafter 
"Standley") and J. Houle & Fils, Inc. (hereinafter "Houle") at the 2,000 head dairy operated by 
Plaintiffs Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC, (hereinafter collectively "DeGroot"). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In connection with the improper design and construction of the manure system, DeGroot 
filed its Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on September 12, 2001 and its First Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 21, 2001. I Standley filed its Verified Answer 
and Counterclaim on February 22,2002.2 
DeGroot filed its Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Beltman Construction, 
Inc. d/b/a Beltman Welding and Construction ("Beltman") in the Third Judicial District of Idaho 
in and for the County of Canyon, Case No. CV05-2277.3 Beltman filed its Third Party 
Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial against Standley on March 22, 2005. The Court entered an 
order consolidating the Beltman litigation with the case against Standley on April 19, 2005. 
Thereafter, on May 11, 2005, Beltman filed its First Amended Third Party Complaint and 
1 R. Vol. I, pp. 23-46. 
2 Id., pp. 47-52. 
3 DeGroot filed its First Amended Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial on March 21,2005. 
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Demand/or Jury Trial against Standley.4 The BeItman action was consolidated with the Standley 
action.5 
DeGroot and BeItman eventually settled. As part of the settlement, DeGroot took an 
assignment of BeItman's claims against Standley. Thereafter, on September 11, 2006, DeGroot 
moved for an order pursuant to Rule 25( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure substituting it as 
the Third Party Plaintiff. The trial court granted the motion for substitution and entered an order 
to that effect on October 25, 2006. 
On March 22, 2005, the trial court granted Standley's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
both the claims asserted by DeGroot, and on Standley's counterclaim.6 The trial court affirmed 
that decision on March 28,2005.7 DeGroot sought reconsideration of the trial court's ruling on 
April 27, 2007.8 
Standley subsequently moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted by DeGroot 
as an assignee of BeItman.9 The trial court denied that motion on April 30, 2007. 10 Standley 
thereafter sought partial summary judgment of the claims assigned to DeGroot. 11 On November 
8,2011, the trial court granted Standley summary judgment as to all claims asserted in BeItman's 
Third Party Complaint. 12 Standley moved for its attorney fees and costs and the trial court 
4 Supp. R., pp. 43-52. 
5 Id., pp. 67-71. 
6 R. Vol. II, pp. 374-76. 
7 Id., pp. 377-379. 
8 R. Vol. III, pp. 556-62. 
9 R. Vol. II, pp. 389-450. 
IO R. Vol. IV, pp. 612-15. 
11 R. Vol. V, pp. 768-783. 
12 Id., pp. 907-10. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 2 
awarded fees and costs on or about December 29, 2011Y 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In 1998, DeGroot purchased a parcel of property in Melba, Idaho for the purpose of 
establishing a 2,000 plus cow dairy.14 In February 1999, DeGroot spoke with Kurt Standley at a 
trade show in California about installing a manure handling system at his new dairy. 15 DeGroot 
was also aware of Standley and its services by virtue of advertisements Standley placed in dairy 
trade magazines. 16 Standley was displaying "Houle" equipment at the trade show as a dealer of 
Houle equipment. 17 Although Standley had only recently become a dealer for Houle, it had been 
concentrating on doing dairy construction work since 1994.18 
In June 1999, Beltman was hired as the general contractor for the construction of 
DeGroot's 2,000 plus cow dairy outside of Melba, Idaho. 19 Thereafter, Beltman contracted with 
Standley to design and install manure handling equipment for DeGroot's dairy.2o Although 
DeGroot was not a party to the contract between Beltman and Standley, it was the intended 
beneficiary of that contract. 21 Further, following Standley's installation of the manure handling 
equipment, DeGroot worked directly with Standley to try and correct numerous defects in the 
manure handling system.22 
13 R. VoI.VI, 1120-27. 
14 R. Vol. II, p. 208. 
15 Id., p. 213. 
16 R. Vol. III, p. 472 
17 R. Vol. II, p. 213. 
18 !d., p. 255. 
19 !d., p. 209; p. 214. 
20 !d., pp. 209-10. 
21 Id., pp. 209-10; 212. 
22 Id., p. 216. 
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From August through November 1999, Standley designed and selected the materials and 
equipment for, and subsequently installed, the manure handling equipment at the DeGroot 
dairy?3 The contract between Standley and Beltman called for Standley to install a flood system, 
drain system and manure handling equipment.24 In connection with the contract, Standley 
selected the number of slope screens, pumps and pump valves to be used, as well as the pipe 
sizing and type of pump to be used?5 Standley helped design the flush system based on its own 
experience and with the help of engineers from Houle?6 
In connection with the manure handling system, Beltman relied upon Standley's 
experience and expertise in identifying the specifications for and installing the manure handling 
system.27 DeGroot, too, relied upon Standley's expertise and representations regarding the Houle 
equipment that would be installed at the dairy during the construction of the dairy.28 
Although the manure handling system installed by Standley worked briefly after DeGroot 
began operation of the dairy, shortly thereafter it failed and DeGroot was "always repairing it.,,29 
Further, following Standley's design and installation of the manure handling system, DeGroot 
worked directly with Standley to try and correct numerous defects in the manure handling 
system.3D 
23 Id., pp. 209-10; pp. 265-266. A true and correct copy of the bid contract is found at R. Vol. II, pp. 233-35. 
24 R. Vol. III, p. 462; p. 464; pp. 467-70. 
25 !d., pp. 461-65. 
26 Id., p. 466. 
27 Id., p. 475; p. 477; p. 478; p. 480. 
28 Id., p. 457; 473; 482. 
29 R. Vol. II, p. 219. 
30 !d., pp. 265-267; R. Vol. I, pp. 86-91. 
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The problems with the system installed by Standley were numerous, and were brought to 
Standley's attention.3l First, the lagoon pump which supplied water for flushing the free stalls 
was inadequate and required many modifications and upgrades.32 As originally designed, 
Standley installed a forty-horse power pump.33 The initial forty horsepower pump was replaced 
with a fifty horsepower and again with a seventy-five horsepower pump.34 These attempts to 
increase the volume of water from the lagoon pump were not effective, and instead caused 
serious electrical problems.35 Specifically, Idaho Power had to replace the transformer because 
the pump(s) were blowing bayonet fuses due to failure of the breaker box installed at the south 
end of the lagoon.36 DeGroot incurred over $5,000 in expenses for electrical repairs to the pump 
and breaker box at the lagoon.37 It also is significant that despite Standley'S various attempts to 
increase water volume for flushing, through increased horsepower, the free stalls still were not 
washed properly, instead requiring frequent manual scrapings that otherwise would not be 
necessary.38 
Second, DeGroot expended sizeable sums in renovating the manure screening setup. 
Standley originally installed two roller presses and two slope screens to handle the dairy waste.39 
The roller presses moved the manure onto a conveyor which, in tum, moved the manure to a 
31 !d., p. 239; p. 243. 
32 Id., p. 241; p. 243. 
33 Id., p. 2lO; p. 262; p. 266; p. 243. 
34 !d. 
35Id. 
36 Id., pp. 266-67. 
37Id. pp. 290-96. 
38 !d., p. 242; p. 245. 
39 !d., p. 212; 217; 219. 
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stacker.4o The roller presses, conveyor and stacker, however, never functioned as designed, 
warranted or intended. 41 Both the conveyor and stacker belts continually broke, resulting in 
DeGroot paying unanticipated costs for replacements.42 In fact, within months of installation, the 
roller presses, conveyor and stacker were removed and the slope screens were placed atop a 
concrete wall in an attempt to remedy the inadequate design, forcing DeGroot to incur additional 
expense.43 
Third, the agitator pumps installed by Standley were not sufficient to keep up with the 
flow of 'green water' from the free stalls.44 Pursuant to Standley's design, two agitator pumps 
were installed in the holding pond to pump the manure water through the slope screens.45 
However, the two pumps were inadequate to handle the waste created by the dairy cows.46 
Standley's design (two pumps) would be sufficient for a dairy milking between five and six 
hundred cows - not the number of cows DeGroot milked.47 Notably, Standley was aware that the 
DeGroot dairy was designed to milk over 4,000 COWS.48 As a result, manure accumulated in the 
holding pond, which then had to be scraped with a tractor.49 The manure scraped from the 
holding pond could not be run through the slope screens, thus reducing the amount of compost 
40 !d., p. 212; 215. 
41Id. 
42Id, p. 212; p. 215; p. 267. 
43 Id., pp. 244-45. 
44 Id. p. 264; pp. 270-71. 
45 Id., p. 215. 
46 !d., p. 243. 
47 !d., pp. 315-27. 
48 Id., pp. 265. 
49 !d., p. 242; p. 245 
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ultimately available for use in the free stalls, not to mention the difficulty associated with 
scraping out the holding pond.5o 
Thereafter, DeGroot continued to experience problems with various parts of the manure 
handling system, particularly its inability to adequately flush the lanes, the undersizing of the 
drain pipe, the collection pit which was too shallow, the inadequate roller presses and slope 
screens, and problems with the conveyor belts that transported the pressed manure to a stacker. 51 
Further, at no time did Houle or Standley ever provide DeGroot with Owner's Manuals 
for the equipment nor did they inform DeGroot of required maintenance on the equipment. 52 
Rather, Standley's and Houle's representatives assured DeGroot the system would function as 
intended and would all but run itself with little if any involvement by DeGroot. 53 
Based upon the numerous design and installation flaws associated with the manure 
handling system installed at the dairy, DeGroot was forced to replace the manure handling 
equipment and install equipment capable of handling the needs of the dairy.54 DeGroot revoked 
its acceptance of the manure handling equipment sold and installed by Standley. 55 
As a direct and proximate result of the numerous inadequacies with the manure handling 
system, DeGroot suffered damages in the form of lost milk production, increased labor costs, 
costs to correct the system, loss of feed in the free stalls, costs associated with repairing the 
50 Id. 
51 !d., p. 215; pp. 217-221. 
52 !d., p. 263. 
53 !d., p. 245. 
54 !d., p. 244. 
55 !d., pp. 344-48. 
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system as well as future costs to correct the system installed by Standley.56 DeGroot hired Mr. 
Kenneth E. Hooper to calculate its economic loss caused by the improperly designed system. 57 
Conservatively, Mr. Hooper estimated DeGroot's damages between $603,005 and $691,920 -
exclusive of attorney fees and costs. 58 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 59 
A. Whether the trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on DeGroot's 
Affirmative Claims as follows: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in finding that DeGroot was not a Third Party 
Beneficiary of the contract between Beltman and Standley; 
b. Whether the trial court erred in determining that DeGroot could not maintain 
warranty claims against Standley; 
c. Whether the trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on 
DeGroot's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
d. Whether the trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on 
DeGroot's claim brought pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; 
e. Whether the trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on 
DeGroot's claim of rescission against Standley. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on its 
counterclaim and claim attorney fees. 
C. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claims as an assignee of Beltman 
against Standley. 
56 Id., pp. 290-328. 
57Id. 
58 !d. 
59 The first two issues identified in Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal relate to claims against Houle & Fils, Inc. As 
Plaintiff has since settled its claims against this party, those issues are no longer at hand. 
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D. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Standley attorney fees and costs in defending 
the claims asserted by DeGroot. 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
DeGroot requests its attorney fees and costs associated with bringing this appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e), I.A.R. 41, and 
all other applicable state law. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING STANDLEY SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON DEGROOT'S AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST STANDLEY 
1. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, this 
Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6o When assessing a motion 
for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
party resisting the motion.61 
60 Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., III Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App. 1986). 
61 G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint 
School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154,156 (Ct.App. 1994). 
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The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.62 The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the 
nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial.63 Such an absence of evidence may be 
established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a 
review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is 
lacking.64 Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, 
that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so 
under LR.C.P. 56(f).65 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c), 
which is identical in all relevant aspects to LR.C.P. 56(c), stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," 
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving 
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 66 
62 Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404,848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App. 1992). 
63 Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d475, 478 (Ct.App. 1994). 
64 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App. 2000). 
65 Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156. 
66 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273-74 (1986) 
(citations omitted). 
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The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in Idaho. 67 
2. DeGroot is a third party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman 
a. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether DeGroot was a 
third party beneficiary to the contract between Beltman and Standley 
Standley's primary challenge to DeGroot's claims is the assertion that DeGroot does not 
have contractual privity with Standley. As the intended beneficiary of the bid contract between 
Beltman and Standley, however, DeGroot is entitled to enforce the contract and obtain damages 
for Standley's breach. Idaho Code § 29-102 expressly provides that: 
Enforcement by a beneficiary.-A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a 
third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto 
rescind it. 
The basic test for determining a party's status as a third party beneficiary is whether the 
agreement reflects an intent to directly benefit such third party.68 Intent must be gleaned from the 
contract itself "unless that document is ambiguous, whereupon the circumstances surrounding its 
formation may be considered.,,69 It is not necessary that the plaintiff be named and identified 
individually within the agreement.70 
In this case, the contract executed by Standley to design and install a manure handling 
system for DeGroot's dairy was made for the direct and primary benefit of DeGroot. Prior to 
submitting its bid, Standley met with DeGroot, marketed Houle equipment, and spoke with him 
67 Dunnick, 126 Idaho at 312,882 P.2d at 479. 
68 Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 874 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 
125 Idaho 409,871 P.2d 826 (1994). 
69 Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532, 446 P.2d 895 (1968). 
70 Just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 464,583 P.2d 997 (1978). 
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specifically about submitting a bid for installation of the manure handling system. At the time the 
contract was entered into, Standley knew that DeGroot would be paying for the construction of 
the dairy, including installation of the manure handling system. Thus, installation of the manure 
handling system would inure to the benefit of DeGroot upon completion. 
Further, DeGroot was the specifically named "customer" on Standley's invoices, thus 
indicating the intent to directly benefit DeGroot with the installation of the manure handling 
system. 71 It must also be recognized that without payment from DeGroot to Standley, there 
would be no need to install the system. At the very least, these facts raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether DeGroot was the intended beneficiary of the contract between 
Standley and Beltman. 
It is also important to note the warranties on the system went to DeGroot. For example, 
the equipment came with a warranty registration form. 72 Kurt Standley testified that there was a 
warranty that he would have honored on the equipment at the DeGroot Dairy.73 In fact, warranty 
work was performed on the dairy that DeGroot was not charged for, however, Standley did not 
keep specific records tracking that work. 74 This relationship evidences the fact that DeGroot was 
in fact a third party beneficiary of the contract. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Standley relied heavily upon the Court of Appeals 
decision in Nelson v. Anderson Lumber CO. 75 In that case, the plaintiff contracted for a building 
71 R. VoL II, p. 123; p. 231 
72 R. VoL IV,p. 569. 
73 R. Vol. II, p. 266. 
74/d 
75 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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package which included plans and materials for a cabin which was to be constructed.76 The 
plaintiff completed construction of his cabin and was informed that the "structure of the cabin 
did not meet the snow load requirements for that 10cation.,,77 The plaintiff brought suit against 
the general contractor as well as the subcontractors involved in the project.78 The trial court 
granted summary judgment as to the subcontractors finding that the plaintiff was not a third party 
beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractors and the plaintiff 
appealed.79 
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals relied upon a treatise as well as 
the restatement of contracts as follows: 
Such contracts [between a principal contractor and subcontractors] are made to 
enable the principal contractor to perform; and their performance by the 
subcontractor does not in itself discharge the principal contractor's duty to the 
owner with whom he has contracted. The installation of plumbing fixtures or the 
construction of cement floors by a subcontractor is not a discharge of the principal 
contractor's duty to the owner to deliver a finished building containing those 
items; and if after their installation the undelivered building is destroyed by fire, 
the principal contractor must replace them for the owner, even though he must 
pay the subcontractor in full and has no right that the latter shall replace them. It 
seems, therefore, that the owner has no right against the subcontractor, in the 
absence of clear words to the contrary. The owner is neither a creditor beneficiary 
nor a donee beneficiary; the benefit that he receives from performance must be 
regarded as merely incidental. 80 
The Court of Appeals also relied upon the following hypothetical scenario: "A contracts 
to erect a building for C. B then contracts with A to supply lumber needed for the building. C is 
76 Nelson, 140 Idaho at 705. 
77 !d., p. 705. 
78 !d., pp. 705-06. 
79 Id., p. 706. 
80 Id., p. 709 (citing 9 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 779D (1979». 
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an incidental beneficiary ofB's promise, and B is an incidental beneficiary of e's promise to pay 
A for the building. ,,81 
This case is distinguishable from Nelson. In Nelson, all of the contracts were oral with no 
identification of plaintiff Nelson as a beneficiary.82 Here, the contract at issue is the written bid 
prepared by Standley.83 That written bid specifically identifies the "DeGroot Dairy.,,84 This alone 
raises a question of material fact as to whether DeGroot was the intended beneficiary of the 
contract. 
Second, the subcontractors identified in Nelson were merely suppliers of materials. In this 
case, it must be recognized that Standley is much more than a materials supplier. Standley was 
intimately involved in the design and installation of the manure handling system that was 
designed specifically for the DeGroot dairy. This was a custom designed dairy for DeGroot in 
which Standley was intimately involved with from the beginning. Additionally, DeGroot 
specifically instructed Beltman that it was to use Standley's bid. In other words, Beltman had no 
choice in accepted the bid prepared by Standley because of DeGroot's instruction.85 These facts 
are clearly different than those presented in Nelson. 
Nelson is further distinguishable because the plaintiffs in Nelson did not predicate their 
claims on a third-party beneficiary theory in their complaint.86 In fact, it was not until the hearing 
on the defendant's motion for summary judgment that the plaintiffs argued this theory. Even at 
81Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, illus. 19 (1981». 
82 Id., p. 708 (recognizing that "there is no written contract between any of the parties."). 
83 R. Vol. II., pp. 233-235. 
84 !d. 
85 R. Vol. III, p. 446. 
86 Nelson, 140 Idaho at 709. 
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that point, however, the plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence to support such a theory.87 In 
contrast, the Second Amended Complaint plainly alleges a third party beneficiary theory and 
DeGroot has adduced substantial evidence, as detailed above, of his status as an intended 
beneficiary . 
The decision in Nelson notwithstanding, a finding that DeGroot is not entitled to recover 
from Standley is not in the best interest of judicial economy and would lead to an absurd result. 
The following example, cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 
illustrates this point: 
... suppose an unscrupulous builder constructed a home of inferior quality and 
sold it to another. Suppose further, that for whatever reason, the buyer after three 
months sold the home to a second purchaser. And one month later the foundation 
of the house split apart rendering the home valueless. Should the common law 
deny the subsequent purchaser a remedy against the builder merely because there 
is no privity of contract and because the damages happen to be purely economic, 
when it was the conduct of the builder which created the latent defect in the first 
place?88 
Although the question presented in Coffin was whether subsequent purchasers of residential 
dwellings, not in privity with the builder, could recover from the builder for latent defects based 
upon an implied warranty of habitability, its rationale is no less compelling in this case. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in determining that DeGroot was not a third 
party beneficiary of the contract between Beltman and Standley. 
87Id. 
88 113 Idaho 37, 51, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). 
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3. DeGroot is entitled to seek damages against Standley for breach of warranty 
As discussed above, the evidence establishes that DeGroot was a third-party beneficiary 
of the bid contract between Standley and Beltman. As such, DeGroot can recover damages for 
Standley's breach of warranties. 
a. Express Warranties 
Idaho Code § 28-2-313(1) indicates when express warranties are created by a seller: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the description. 
Express warranties may be created by the manufacturer, seller or builder by way of contract, 
advertising materials, oral representations or descriptions regarding the condition or performance 
of the product. 89 The buyer of goods need not rely on the affirmation of fact, promise or 
description for the same to become part of the basis of the bargain.9o An affirmation of fact is 
assumed to become the basis of the bargain.91 
In this case, Standley argues that there is no evidence that Standley made any express 
warranties to DeGroot. The only evidence Standley relies on to support this argument, however, 
is Charles DeGroot's testimony that he had no direct contract with Standley. However, a direct 
contractual relationship does not appear to be required by the statute itself or the case law 
89 Jensen v. Seigel Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 194-95,668 P.2d 65 (1983). 
90 Id. at 195. 
91 Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplof Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 611,862 P.2d 299 (1993). 
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interpreting the statute. Moreover, Charles DeGroot's testimony notwithstanding, there is ample 
evidence showing that Standley did, in fact, make certain affirmations of fact that amount to 
express warranties. For example, Ernest DeGroot testified in his deposition that he recalled Jeff 
Griggs, a Standley employee, telling him (with respect to whether DeGroot should be performing 
any maintenance on the manure handling system), "You won't have to worry about it.',n 
Moreover, Standley spoke with Charles DeGroot in February 1999 about Houle equipment and 
about installing such equipment in DeGroot's dairy. Indeed, Standley held itself out as having 
specific expertise in Houle's manure handling equipment, which is why DeGroot ultimately 
decided to have Standley involved in the project. Given these factors, it is clear that Standley did 
provide express warranties to DeGroot. 
b. Implied Warranties 
DeGroot also seeks recovery for Standley'S breach of the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Idaho Code § 28-2-314(1) provides that 
"unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a 
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." To be 
merchantable, the goods must be at least such as (1) pass without objection in the trade under the 
contract description; (2) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are sued; and (3) 
conform to the promises or affirmations made on the container or label, if any. Idaho Code § 28-
2-314(2). Similarly, Idaho Code § 28-2-315 provides: 
92 R. Vol. II, p. 238. 
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Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be fit for such purpose. 
Standley relied on Nelson, supra, and Salmon River Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) to support its argument that without privity of 
contract, DeGroot cannot recover from Standley for breach of implied warranties. While Nelson 
relied on Salmon Rivers as a starting point in reaching its decision that homeowners cannot 
recover from materials suppliers for breach of warranties unless there is a contract that expresses 
an intent to benefit the homeowner, the Nelson court failed to consider the continued validity of 
the Salmon Rivers decision. Indeed, following its decision in Salmon Rivers, the Idaho Supreme 
Court on two separate occasions questioned its holding in that case. 
First, in State v. Mitchell Construction Co., two members of the Court expressed 
disapproval of the privity requirement expressed in Salmon Rivers.93 For example, in his 
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Donaldson advocated the following approach adopted by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976):94 
Courts and scholars alike have recognized that the typical 
consumer does not deal at arms length with the party whose 
product he buys. Rather, he buys from a retail merchant who is 
usually little more than an economic conduit. It is not the merchant 
who has defectively manufactured the product. Nor is it usually the 
merchant who advertises the product on such a large scale as to 
93 108 Idaho 335,699 P.2d 1349 (1984). 
94 In spite of his disapproval of the Salmon Rivers holding, Chief Justice Donaldson concurred in the result because 
Mitchell presented no evidence to support its claims that express warranties were given by the subcontractor. 
Justice Huntley offered a dissenting opinion that likewise questioned the continued validity of the Salmon Rivers 
decision. 
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attract customers. We have in our society literally scores of large, 
financially responsible manufacturers who place their wares in the 
stream of commerce not only with the realization, but with the 
avowed purpose, that these goods will find their way into the hands 
of the consumer. Only the consumer will use these products; and 
only the consumer will be injured by them should they prove 
defective.95 
In advocating the abolition of the privity requirement, the Morrow court noted that 
limiting consumers to an implied warranty action under the DCC against their immediate sellers 
"in those instances where the products defect is attributable to the manufacturer would 
effectively promote circularity of litigation and waste of judicial resources.,,96 Although the 
Mitchell court called into doubt the validity of Salmon Rivers, a majority of the court found that 
the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of warranties; therefore, Salmon Rivers 
was not expressly overruled. On rehearing, however, Justice Bistline changed his position and 
voted to overrule Salmon Rivers.97 
Later, in Tusch Enterprises, supra, the Court again voiced its concern with Salmon 
Rivers. As discussed previously, the Tusch court held that privity of contract was not required in 
order for a subsequent purchaser of a residential dwelling to recover against the builder (or 
builder-developer) based upon the implied warranty of habitability.98 In so holding, the Court 
specifically declined to extend the privity requirement enunciated in Salmon Rivers, noting: 
95 Mitchell Construction, 108 Idaho at 338 (Donaldson, C.J., concurring)(intemal citations and quotations omitted). 
96Id. 
97 As recognized by Justice Bistline, Salmon Rivers remains viable only because Chief Justice Donaldson concurred 
in the result in Mitchell. Thus, the judgment affirming the district court stood up on rehearing even though Salmon 
Rivers, the backbone of the district court's decision granting summary judgment, was overruled. 
98 113 Idaho at 50-51. 
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Historically, therefore, the only tort action available to a 
disappointed purchaser suffering intangible commercial loss has 
been the tort action of deceit for fraud and the only contract action 
has been for breach of warranty, express or implied. This remains 
the generally accepted view. A few courts in recent years have 
permitted either a tort action for negligence or one in strict 
liability. Usually, the reason for so doing has been to escape the 
requirement of privity of contract as a prerequisite to recovery on a 
warranty theory. But the elimination of this requirement for 
recovery on a contract-warranty theo~ would seem to 
constitute the more satisfactory technique.9 
In light of the questionable significance of the Salmon Rivers privity requirement, 
coupled with the overwhelming evidence that DeGroot was the intended third-party beneficiary 
of the bid contract, the trial court erred in determining that DeGroot was not entitled to assert 
warranty claims against Standley. 
4. The trial court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claims for Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
As discussed previously, a third-party beneficiary of a contract may enforce the contract 
made expressly for his benefit. 100 As clearly set forth in the deposition testimony and exhibits 
relied upon by DeGroot (and discussed previously), the bid contract was made expressly for 
DeGroot's benefit. Therefore, DeGroot is entitled to enforce the bid contract, which includes 
claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because the evidence clearly 
establishes DeGroot is a third-party beneficiary of the bid contract, summary judgment is not 
appropriate on DeGroot's claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
99 [d. at 50. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
100 Idaho Code § 29-102. 
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5. The trial court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claims brought pursuant to the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act 
Pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, 
the following unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce 
are hereby declared to be unlawful, where a person knows, or in 
the exercise of due care should know, that he has in the past, or is: 
(6) Representing that goods are original or new if they are 
deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or 
secondhand; 
(7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, 
quality, or grade, or that goods are of particular style or model, if 
they are of another; 
101 
The acts or practices that are unlawful under the Act are only those that are "in the conduct of 
any trade or commerce.,,102 "Trade" and "commerce" are defined by the Act to mean "the 
advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any goods or services, directly or indirectly 
affecting the people of this state.,,103 
In interpreting the ICPA, Idaho courts have held that it is a sale that is the crucial event in 
determining whether a transaction is subject to the ACt. 104 Likewise, a cause of action under the 
ICPA must be based on a contract. 105 A review of the cases reveals, however, that Idaho courts 
have not had occasion to determine whether a third-party beneficiary of a contract may bring an 
action under the ICP A. Even if DeGroot is found not to be a third-party beneficiary of the bid 
101 Idaho Code § 48-603. 
102 Id.; In re Western Acceptance Corp., Inc., 117 Idaho 399, 401, 788 P.2d 214 (1990). 
103 Idaho Code § 48-602(2). 
104 Western Acceptance Corp., 117 Idaho at 401. 
105 Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788,640 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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contract entered into between Standley and Beltman, the factual circumstances of this case 
require that DeGroot be allowed to pursue his claims under the ICPA against Standley. 
In this case, Standley is a dealer of Houle equipment. 106 As a dealer, Standley held itself 
out as having particular expertise and knowledge of Houle equipment by appearing at trade 
shows in Idaho and Califomia. l07 It was at one of these trade shows that DeGroot spoke with 
Kurt Standley about using Houle equipment in DeGroot's dairy. 108 
In fact, the very equipment that Standley was displaying at its trade show in Nampa was 
the equipment that was ultimately installed at DeGroot's dairy. 109 As evidenced by the numerous 
defects in the manure handling system designed and installed by Standley, however, it is at least 
questionable whether Standley actually did have such expertise. 
Because DeGroot has, at a minimum, raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the 
nature of Standley's representations about his expertise and/or the Houle equipment, the trial 
court erred in granting Standley's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
6. The trial court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claim of rescission against Standley 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-2-608 a buyer may revoke acceptance of goods if the non-
conformity of the goods substantially impairs their value, and if the buyer has accepted the goods 
on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and it has not seasonably 
been cured. 110 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a "buyer" is one who "buys or contracts to 
106 R. Vol. II, p. 257. 
107 Id., p. 213; p. 241. 
108 Id. 
109 Id., p. 241. 
110 Idaho Code § 28-2-608(1)(a); Beal v. Griffin, 123 Idaho 445,449,849 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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buy goods;" a "seller" is one who "sells or contracts to sell goods." III Acceptance can only be 
revoked within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground 
for the revocation. 112 A buyer rejects non-conforming goods by taking affirmative action to avoid 
acceptance and by notifying the seller of the rejection within a reasonable time. II3 
With respect to DeGroot's entitlement to rescission, it is notable what Standley does not 
argue. It does not argue, for example, that DeGroot did not effectively revoke acceptance by 
sending notice of the revocation. Likewise, Standley does not argue that DeGroot's notice of 
revocation was not given within a reasonable time. Indeed, the only argument Standley offers in 
support of its claim that DeGroot is not entitled to rescission is that there is no contractual 
relationship between Standley and DeGroot. Notably, however, Standley offers no support for its 
claim that a contractual relationship is required by the DCC. This is most likely because the DCC 
does not, in fact, require such a contractual relationship, as the definitions of "buyer" and "seller" 
make clear. By using the disjunctive "or" within the definition, it is clear that the legislature 
contemplated even the simplest sales transaction, which would include a contract to buy. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in granting Standley's motion for summary judgment 
on DeGroot's rescission claim. 
III Idaho Code § 28-2-103(a), (d) (emphasis added). 
112 Idaho Code § 28-2-608(2). 
113 Idaho Code § 28-2-602. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF STANDLEY ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Standard of Review 
As the trial court ruled on Standley's counterclaim as a matter of law on a motion for 
summary judgment, the standard of review outlined supra, is applicable to these issues and will 
not be repeated here. 
2. The trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on its counterclaim 
On May 12, 2003, Standley filed its Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counter 
Claim asserting an affirmative claim for costs associated with "numerous service calls" to the 
DeGroot dairy.114 Shortly thereafter on January 31, 2005, Standley moved for summary 
judgment, requesting $20,259.57. 115 DeGroot contested the motion for summary judgment, 
asserting that the questions of fact with respect to DeGroot's underlying claims prevented a 
finding on Standley's counterclaimY6 DeGroot also asserted affirmative defenses such as breach 
of warranties, negligent installation of the manure system, statute of frauds, breach of the 
covenant of good faith, and offset. 117 
The trial court heard oral argument on the counterclaim on March 1, 2005. The trial court 
found that the counterclaim related to an open account and that summary judgment was 
appropriate. 118 On a Motion for Reconsideration, it was again argued that summary judgment 
114 R. Vol. I, pp. 77-82. 
115Id, pp. 83-113. 
116 Id., pp. 180-201; R. Vol. II, pp. 202-349. 
117 R. Vol. I, pp. 53-57; March 1,2005 hearing, p. 44. 
118 March 1,2005 hearing, p. 73. 
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was not appropriate. 119 The trial court, however, denied DeGroot's Motion for 
R '-1 • 120 econslueratlOn. 
DeGroot pled the following affirmative defenses to Standley's counterclaim: Breach of 
warranties, breach of contract, failure of consideration, negligence, statute of frauds, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and offset. 121 For the same reasons issues of 
material fact exist with respect to DeGroot's affirmative claims, issues of fact remain on the 
affirmative defenses to Standley's counterclaim. 
It must also be recognized that the trial court's ruling that DeGroot cannot assert a claim 
against Standley for breach of contract but that Standley is entitled judgment on its claim for 
efforts to correct the problems with the faulty manure system is an inconsistent and inequitable 
result. In essence, the trial court found that while DeGroot did not have a contract with Standley, 
Standley had a contract with DeGroot which completely ignores the actual relationship between 
the parties. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of Standley on 
its asserted counterclaim. 
3. The award of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest on the counterclaim should be 
reversed 
In connection with granting Standley's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court 
awarded 12% prejudgment interest. I22 Thereafter, the trial court entered its Order on Costs and 
119 May 31, 2005 Hearing, p. 85. 
12°Id, pp. 91-95. 
121 R. Vol. I, pp. 54-55. 
122 May 31, 2005 Hearing, p. 85. 
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Attorney Fees, awarding Standley attorney's fees and costs associated with the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 123 
As outlined above, the granting of summary judgment on Standley's counterclaim was in 
error. Further, the impact of DeGroot's affirmative defense of 'offset' would factor into any 
amount of prejudgment interest. Additionally, the prospect of an 'offset' precludes a finding that 
the amount due was in fact, liquidated, at any given point. At the very least, issues of material 
fact surrounding DeGroot's affirmative defenses prevent a finding that Standley was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court's ruling on attorney's fees and costs 
should be reversed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DEGROOT'S CLAIMS AS 
ASSIGNEE OF BELTMAN 
1. Standard of Review 
As the assigned claims were dismissed by the trial court on a motion for summary 
judgment, the standard of review outlined supra, is applicable to these issues and will not be 
repeated here. 
2. Introduction 
The trial court heard argument on Standley'S Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
claims that Beltman assigned to DeGroot, over the course of two days first on September 7, 2011 
and then on October 21, 2011. In connection with that motion, Standley also filed a motion in 
limine regarding the issue of indemnity. On September 7, 2011, the trial court ruled on the issues 
123 R. Vol. VI, pp. 1120-27. 
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of express warranty and the claim of rescission in Standley's favor. The trial court found that the 
if the issues in the Motion in Limine were ruled in favor of Standley, the case would be "largely 
over.,,124 The trial court requested additional briefing on the issue of indemnification, and set a 
hearing of October 21,2011 for further oral argument. 
At the hearing on October 21, 2011, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims at 
issue.125 That ruling was premised on the finding that DeGroot's causes of action were never 
liquidated against Standley because there was never a finding made that Beltman was at fault. 126 
For the following reasons, that finding should be reversed. 
3. The trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on DeGroot's express 
warranty claims 
On the issue of express warranty, the trial court found that there was "no indication that 
Beltman placed any reliance" on statements made by Standley. The trial court found therefore 
that such statements had no bearing on the contract and granted Standley's Motionfor Summary 
Judgment on that issue. 127 
As confirmed by the trial court, the "predominant factor" of the transaction at issue in this 
case is for the sale of goods. Order Determining Predominant Factor of Contract, issued April 
30,2007. 
124 September 7, 2011 hearing, p. 69. 
125 October 21,2011 hearing, pp. 97-99. 
126 Id., p. 98. 
127 September 7, 2011 hearing, p. 60. 
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Express warranties are governed by Idaho Code § 28-2-313: 
Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample. - (1) 
Express warranties created by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes a basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description. 
( c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to 
the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use 
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention 
to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty. 128 
Further, Idaho Code § 28-2-315 governs the applicability of an implied warranty for a particular 
purpose: 
Implied warranty - Fitness for particular purpose. - Where the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods 
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select 
or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next 
section, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 129 
On its Motion for Summary Judgment, Standley contended that no affirmation or promise 
was made to Beltman to create any express warranties, and even if such statements did exist, 
they were not a basis of the bargain. First, whether the description of the goods in question 
become a basis of the bargain "are questions of fact sufficient to preclude summary 
128 Idaho Code § 28-2-313. 
129 Idaho Code § 28-2-315. 
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judgment.,,130 Comment 3 to I.e. § 28-2-313 states in part: "In actual practice affirmations of fact 
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of 
those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave 
them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather any fact which is to take such affirmations, once 
made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact." 
(emphasis added). 
Further, Idaho case law is clear that there is a presumption that an affirmation of fact 
does become a basis of the bargain. l3l Here, Standley failed to introduce any evidence that the 
affirmations of fact did not become a basis of the bargain. 
Moreover, Standley argued that because Beltman had no choice in accepting Standley's 
bid, the identified statements could not become the basis of the bargain. 132 However, there can be 
many terms that become the basis for the bargain, irrespective of whether Beltman was required 
to accept the bid. Therefore, Standley failed to meet its burden to show that no issues of material 
fact exist with respect to express warranties. 
In addition to the statements identified by Standley in its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Standley prepared its bid based upon a site plan that called for "roughly, about 2,500 cows ... ,,133 
In other words, the bid itself is an express statement that it is sufficient for the size of dairy at 
issue in this case. 
Also, Standley contended that there could be no implied warranty for a particular purpose 
130 Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1011,895 P.2d 1195,1204 (1995). 
131 Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 613,862 P.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1992). 
132 R. Vol. IV, p. 446. 
133 R. Vol. V, p. 820. 
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because Beltman did not rely upon the expertise of Standley. This argument completely ignores 
the deposition testimony of Stanley Beltman and Tom Beltman. As stated above, Beltman relied 
upon Standley's experience and expertise in identifying the specifications for and installing the 
manure handling system. 134 
For example, Stanley Beltman specifically testified as follows: 
Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Standley, Mr. DeGroot or anyone for that 
matter, retaining an engineer to actually do a design on any part of the 
dairy, including the manure system? 
A. I was instructed to rely on his expertise on it, Mr. Standley's. 
Q. And do you believe that your brother's duties were to oversee the work of 
both, Beltman Construction and the subcontractors at the site? 
A. Yes, but the subcontractor - yes, the subcontractor's expertise does not 
fall under ours. You rely upon their expertise. It's like building a house. The 
guy that puts the heating system in, you rely on his expertise. 135 
Similarly, Thomas Beltman testified as follows: 
Q. And that is a very good question. How were you overseeing the project 
when you didn't have the information at hand? 
A. That is a good question. Because we relied on the expertise of Standley 
& Company to put in a manure system. 136 
The deposition statements by representatives of Beltman clearly and unequivocally raise 
genuine issues of material fact as to the reliance of Beltman on the expertise of Standley. 
Whether or not DeGroot chose Standley is simply not relevant to the issue of whether or not 
Beltman relied upon Standley. As such, there was simply no basis for the trial court to dismiss 
134 R. Vol. III, p. 475; 477; 478; 480. 
135Id, p. 475. 
136 Id., p. 480 (emphasis added). 
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the claim of breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
4. The trial court erred in granting Standley summary judgment on the Issue of 
reSCISSIOn 
Standley also moved for summary judgment on the issue of rescission arguing that notice 
of rescission was not communicated to Standley within a reasonable time. While not couched as 
a "laches" argument as it was in Standley's last unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, the 
issues are substantially the same. Standley basically argues that it was not notified in a timely 
manner of the claim of rescission. The trial court found that the claim of rescission was not 
brought within a reasonable time.137 
The defense of laches is a creation of equity and is a species of equitable estoppel. 138 
Whether a party is guilty of laches primarily is a question of fact. 139 In order for laches to apply, 
the trier of fact must find: (1) a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is 
asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. 140 In this case, it is undisputed that 
DeGroot notified Standley in June 2001 of its rescission of the manure handling system. 
DeGroot filed its initial complaint against Standley on September 12, 2001, which included a 
cause of action for rescission. Although DeGroot's claims against Standley were ultimately 
dismissed, DeGroot timely asserted its claims against Beltman. Subsequently, Beltrnan asserted 
its claim for rescission against Standley. The question for the jury to decide is whether, under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, DeGroot and/or Beltman diligently pursued its rescission 
J37 September 7, 2011 Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 70. 
138 Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 249, 420 P.2d 11 (1966). 
139 Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492,499 (2004). 
14°Id. 
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claim. 
Courts that have applied the doctrine of laches to actions involving the sale of goods 
have done so where there has been a complete failure to prosecute an action for rescission. For 
example, in Dicenso v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., a Division of Carrier Corp., the Arizona 
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of laches to bar claims against the defendant where, although 
the defendant was named in the complaint, it was not served until three years after the complaint 
was filed. 141 In announcing its decision, the court relied upon the policy underlying the statute of 
limitations, which it described as follows: 
The policy underlying the statute of limitations is primarily for the 
protection of the defendant, and the courts, from litigation of stale 
claims where plaintiffs have slept on their rights and evidence may 
have been lost or witnesses' memories faded. This policy is sound 
and necessary for the orderly administration of justice. 142 
Similarly, in John P. Saad & Sons, Inc. v. Nashville Thermal Transfer Corp./43 the Tennessee 
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of laches to bar a claim against the defendant power plant 
operator where the plaintiff supplier had failed to provide any written demand or notice 
regarding the contract for nearly four years after delivery of the last batch of oil. The court 
discussed at length the policy underlying the doctrine of laches: 
The neglect of a person to make complaint, or bring suit in due 
season, he being sui juris and knowing the facts, or having the 
means of knowledge, is called laches; and where there has been 
gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long and unreasonable 
141 643 P.2d 701, 703 (Ariz., 1982). 
142Id. at 703 (quoting Brooks v. Southern Pacific Co., 105 Ariz. 442, 444, 466 P.2d 736, 738 (1970)). 
143 715 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tenn. 1986). 
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acquiescence in adverse rights, Courts of Equity refuse to interfere, 
they act either by analogy to the statutes of limitations, or upon 
their own inherent doctrine of discouraging antiquated demands. 
The Court realizes the difficuIty of doing entire justice, when the 
original transaction has become obscured by time and the evidence 
lost, and deems it good public policy to allow claims and titles 
long acquiesced in to remain in repose. 144 
Considered against these policies, it is clear that the doctrine of laches should not apply to 
bar BeItman's rescission claim. Standley was notified in June 2001 that DeGroot was unhappy 
with the manure handling system Standley provided and installed. It was only three months later 
that DeGroot filed suit against Standley for the defective manure handling system, which 
included a claim for rescission. By focusing on BeItman's actions, Standley conveniently 
overlooks these facts. Moreover, DeGroot immediately filed its complaint against BeItman 
following the Court's order granting Standley's first motion for summary judgment - certainly 
well within the six month period established by Idaho Code § 28-2-725(3). Neither DeGroot nor 
BeItman had "slept on its rights" or otherwise neglected to "make complaint" against Standley. 
At the very least, the question of reasonableness is one for the jury. Therefore, the trial court's 
order granting Standley summary judgment on this issue should be reversed. 
1441d. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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5. The trial court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claim of indemnification, claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the remaining 
warranty claims for lack of damages 
On October 7, 2011, the trial court analyzed the issue of indemnification. First, it found 
that the claim, through Beltman's Third Party Complaint, was properly pled. 145 Relying on the 
findings that "DeGroot's causes of action against Beltman were never liquidated" and that "[n]o 
finder of fact ever determined whether Beltman was at fault and/or whether it had any amount to 
DeGroot for - it had to pay any amount to DeGroot for damages," the trial court granted 
Standley'S Motionfor Summary Judgment. 146 The trial court used the same reasoning to dismiss 
DeGroot's remaining warranty claims as well as the claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
Despite the trial court's ruling, the simple fact is that the damages at issue in this case 
have always been DeGroot's. Beltman did not own the dairy, nor did it ever intend on owning or 
operating the dairy. It is only through DeGroot that Beltman's damages even arise, i.e., Beltman 
had no damages until DeGroot sued it. Indeed, the very essence of third party pleading is that the 
third party defendant's liability be derivative of, or secondary to, that of the defendant in the 
main action. 147 Clearly, DeGroot's damages and Beltman's damages are one and the same. 
Therefore, it was error for the trial court to grant Standley summary judgment on this issue. 
145 October 7, 2011 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 91. 
146 Id., p. 98. 
147 See 12 A.L.R. Fed. § 877 (1972) (citing Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to 
Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and further citing Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Natwest Finance, Inc., 
137 F.Supp.2d 251 (S.D. N.Y. 2000); see also, Stewart v. American Intern. Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196,200 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (noting that "The crucial characteristic ofa Rule 14(a) claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to 
the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff."). 
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Further, it makes no difference, as Standley so strongly urged and the trial court accepted, 
that Beltman did not pay money to DeGroot in satisfaction of the Stipulated Judgment, or that 
DeGroot filed a Satisfaction of Judgment relating to its claims against Beltman. Prior to granting 
summary judgment, the trial court had already determined that the Satisfaction does not affect 
Beltman's claims against Standley, and Standley's covert attempt to resurrect that issue should 
be disregarded by this Court. 
Nor does Rule 14(a) require the Court to limit testimony of damages from experts Burke 
and Hooper, as Standley mistakenly suggested to the trial court. Rule 14(a) provides in pertinent 
part: 
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a 
third-party plaintiff may cause to be served a summons and 
complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may 
be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff.148 
Although there are few Idaho appellate court decisions interpreting Rule 14(a), federal 
courts interpreting its federal counterpart have generally held that the rule is limited to secondary 
liability situations, and does not permit the third party plaintiff to claim from a third party 
defendant properly in the case damages in excess of, or different from, those sought by the 
original plaintiff from the third party plaintiff. 149 The determination of whether a third party "is 
or may be liable" is a threshold issue that is generally decided by courts when a defendant seeks 
148I.R.C.P. 14(a) (emphasis added). 
149 See 12 A.L.R. Fed. § 877. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 35 
to implead a third party defendant. 150 Once that threshold determination is met, the "is or may be 
liable" language of Rule 14(a) is irrelevant. Thus, Standley'S suggestion that Beltman's 
settlement with DeGroot somehow makes the issue of DeGroot's damages irrelevant should be 
rejected as too restrictive a reading of Rule 14(a). 
In this case, DeGroot (through its assigned claims from Beltman) is not asserting it is 
entitled to damages in excess of DeGroot's damages. The damages sought, including damages 
relating to repair costs, system improvement costs and future repair costs, derive directly from 
DeGroot's claims and damages against Beltman. As such, evidence and expert testimony from 
Burke and Hooper on these items of damage are directly relevant to the claims asserted against 
Standley. Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error by disregarding this evidence 
and granting summary judgment to Standley. 
Evidence of DeGroot's incidental and consequential damages are also relevant in this 
case. Standley argued that DeGroot's claims for (1) equipment costs; (2) repair costs; (3) labor 
costs; (4) future repair and modification costs; (5) lost feed; and (6) loss of milk production are 
no longer relevant. 
Idaho Code § 28-2-712(2) specifically states, "The buyer may recover from the seller as 
damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any 
incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (section 28-2-715), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the seller's breach.,,151 Further, Idaho Code § 28-2-713(1) also provides 
that incidental and consequential damages are recoverable in cases dealing with nondelivery or 
150 See Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. Maehl, 117 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1941). 
151 Idaho Code § 28-2-712(2) (emphasis added). 
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repudiation by the seller. Finally, in providing the measure of damages with regard to acceptance 
of nonconforming goods, Idaho Code § 28-2-714(3) states, "In a proper case any incidental and 
consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered.,,152 
It is evident that these damages are highly relevant to DeGroot's available damages 
regardless of whether they are addressed with regard to cover, nondelivery, repudiation, or 
breach of warranty. 
Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 153 provides an example of the grant of incidental 
damages for repair and replacement costs such as those of which Standley seeks to exclude 
testimony of in this case. In Duff, the defendant was found to have breached the implied warranty 
of merchantability in a sale of paneling. 154 In its damage analysis, the Court awarded costs for 
replacing the paneling as well as costs for removing the existing paneling and installing new 
paneling as incidental damages. As was the case in Duff, it is clear that DeGroot has suffered 
incidental and consequential damages with regard to repair costs, system improvement costs, and 
future costs to fully repair the manure handling system. 
As demonstrated above, the trial court's decision to disregard this evidence is contrary to 
Idaho Code as well as established Idaho case law to exclude testimony and evidence regarding 
DeGroot's incidental and consequential damages. As such, this Court should reverse the decision 
of the trial court. 
152 Idaho Code § 28-2-714(3). 
153 105 Idaho 123,666 P.2d 650 (1983). 
154 !d. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING STANDLEY'S ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
On December 29, 2011, the trial court entered its Order on Costs and Attorney Fees 
finding that Standley was the prevailing party in a lawsuit in which the gravamen was a 
commercial transaction. ISS 
First, based on the arguments above, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial 
court granting Standley summary judgment. If it does so, Standley is no longer a prevailing party 
and is not entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
Second, if the ruling on summary judgment is not reversed, Standley is still not entitled to 
fees and costs. Given a finding that there is no contractual privity between DeGroot and 
Standley, it is patently unfair to assess fees against DeGroot based on a finding of a commercial 
transaction. Therefore, Standley is not entitled to fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision granting Standley attorney fees and 
costs should be reversed. 
E. DEGROOT IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES IN PURSUING THIS 
APPEAL 
Because DeGroot believes that it will prevail on the issues argued above, DeGroot is 
entitled to its attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120(3) and LA.R. 41. If it is found that 
DeGroot is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman, a clear 
contractual and commercial transaction has been identified, thereby giving rise to DeGroot's 
claim for attorney's fees. 
155 R. Vol. VI, pp. 1120-27. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, DeGroot respectfully requests this court reverse the decisions of 
the trial court, as argued above, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2013. 
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